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ABSTRACT
We use the Health and Retirement Study to examine the effects of job loss on factors affecting
retirement incentives, including earnings, assets and pensions. We then estimate models of the retirement
decision, which take into account the incentive to retire and any additional effects of displacement that
are not captured by retirement incentives. There are substantial effects of displacement on retirement
incentives as the result of changes to both earnings and pensions. Displacement significantly increases
the probability of retirement, but only a small fraction of the displacement-induced changes in retirement
behavior and labor force participation are the result of workers responding to these altered retirement
incentives.
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  Job loss leads to dramatic and lasting reductions in the employment levels of older 
workers.  Among workers nearing normal retirement ages, reduced employment may represent 
either involuntary non-employment, or voluntary retirement from the labor force.  This paper 
provides a framework for interpreting older workers’ behavior following job loss by combining 
information about job losses with a model of optimal retirement behavior.  Because job loss will 
alter the earnings, pensions and wealth available to workers, we would expect an effect on 
recently displaced workers’ labor force behavior and retirement timing, even in the absence of 
any search costs or barriers to new employment.  We use data from the Health and Retirement 
Study to examine the effects of job loss on components of retirement incentives, including 
earnings and pensions.  We then estimate models of the retirement decision, which take into 
account those retirement incentives along with any additional effects of displacement that are not 
captured by retirement incentives.   
Older workers who have lost jobs have long spells of non-employment and may remain 
out of work for several years after the job loss.
1  This could be the result of difficulty finding new 
employment due to the loss of firm-specific skills, employers’ unwillingness to invest in workers 
near the end of their career, or barriers such as age discrimination.  On the other hand, extended 
joblessness could be an optimal response to changes in workers’ earnings opportunities or 
pension structures.  Distinguishing between these two types of explanations is important for 
developing and evaluating policies to assist older displaced workers.  For example, labor market 
policies that tackle barriers to reemployment and promote the retraining of older workers may be 
appropriate for the former but ineffective for the latter since workers are simply reacting to 
changed financial incentives. 
                                                           
1 See Chan and Stevens (2001a) for a description of the employment experiences of older displaced workers.   2  
Our approach is to combine an empirical examination of retirement behavior after job 
loss with a variant of the option value model of optimal retirement developed by Stock and Wise 
(1990).  This allows us to examine how displacement might impact a worker’s optimal date of 
retirement, as well as to examine the actual retirement patterns of displaced workers.   
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages.  First, we seek to understand how 
workers’ earnings, assets, pensions and the resulting retirement incentive measures are affected 
by job loss.  Second, by controlling for both displacement and retirement incentives, we can see 
whether displacement has effects on retirement or employment beyond those that work to change 
the optimal date of retirement.   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 presents the data we use in 
the subsequent analysis.  Section 2 describes our model of retirement decision-making and the 
empirical strategy for its implementation.  Section 3 gives results from the effects of job loss on 
components of the incentive to retire, while section 4 presents the results of our retirement 
decision estimation.  Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
1.  Data 
 
  To study job loss and retirement, we use publicly released data from the first three waves 
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), conducted in 1992, 1994 and 1996.  We limit our 
sample to individuals between 50 and 75 years of age, with positive earnings some time during 
the three interview waves and with complete information on the starting and ending dates of jobs   3  
held at each of the three waves.
2  Further, because we rely on self-reported pension information, 
we must eliminate individuals who report having a pension, but who do not have sufficient 
information on the type or details of that pension.  Our final sample contains 3,997 men and 
3,962 women.  Without the pension information restriction we would have 4,510 men and 4,154 
women.  Of the individuals in our final sample, 10.5 percent experience a job displacement at 
some time between 1986 and the wave 3 survey.   
To track job loss among older workers in the HRS, we use the extensive information on 
earnings and employment collected at each survey wave, including information on job changes 
that took place between the waves.  We also utilize information collected at the initial survey 
wave relating to previous jobs held.  From the wave 1 data, we obtain information on up to two 
jobs for each individual in the survey.  First, for those working at the wave 1 survey date we use 
information on earnings and employer characteristics on the current job.  Those who are not 
working at wave 1 are asked to provide information on their previous employer, including when 
the job ended, why it ended, and final earnings on that job.  Second, all individuals (employed or 
not at wave 1) are asked to provide information on the most recent previous job that lasted for at 
least five years.  Thus, we also use retrospective information on relatively long-term jobs that 
ended prior to the wave 1 survey.   
We take as our sample of displaced workers those who respond that their job ended when 
either (1) the “business closed” or (2) they were “laid off or let go.”  While the second part of 
this definition may include some individuals fired for cause, we include them for consistency 
with many recent definitions of displaced workers.  Other possible responses to the question 
                                                           
2 This final restriction is necessary to identify the timing of a reported job loss, and results in the loss of about 500 
individual observations.   4  
about how the previous job ended include “quit”, “retired”, “temporary layoff”, and “wanted a 
better job.”    
Employed individuals are asked whether they hold the same job as in the previous wave.  
If not, the reason for leaving the previous wave’s job is ascertained.  Non-employed individuals 
are asked what happened to their last job.  Finally, the HRS questionnaire allows for the 
possibility of multiple jobs held between the survey waves.  Thus, information on “interim” jobs 
– those that both start and end between two survey dates – is collected along with the data on 
jobs held in a previous wave.  Thus, our sample of job losses consists of reported displacements 
from: long-term jobs ending prior to wave 1, jobs held immediately prior to becoming non-
employed at the wave 1 survey date, (up to two) jobs ending between waves 1 and 2, and (up to 
two) jobs ending between waves 2 and 3. 
For each of the jobs documented in the HRS, information is also collected on pension 
eligibility, structure, and benefit amounts.  Similar to the wave 1 job history, pension information 
is collected at the wave 1 survey on pensions connected with both current jobs and jobs that have 
ended.  Then, at each survey wave, respondents are asked whether their pension information has 
changed and what those changes are, or to give pension information for any new job since the 
last survey wave.  Ultimately, for any job reported in the HRS, information is collected on up to 
three different pension plans associated with that employer. 
We are relying on self-reported pension information from the three survey waves of the 
HRS since the employer-matched pension plan file is matched to employer plans for wave 1 
pensions only.
3  While concerns have been raised regarding the accuracy and completeness of 
                                                           
3 Restricted-access pension-provider and social security data matched to the HRS files have been used recently by 
researchers to forecast pension accumulation and social security wealth.  See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), 
McGarry and Davenport (1997), Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1997), Moore and Mitchell (1997), 
Venti and Wise (1997) and Mitchell, Olson and Steinmeier (1996) among others.    5  
self-reported pensions in the HRS, it is the only available source of detailed longitudinal data on 
private pension wealth and eligibility rules among displaced workers.  We do utilize the social 
security earnings history files to calculate individuals’ eligibility for social security benefits at 
alternative retirement ages.   
 
 
2.  The Retirement Decision and Job Loss 
 
The option value model of retirement 
To understand the impact of job loss on retirement, we must first specify the determinants 
of the retirement decision.  To do this, we use a variant of the option-value framework originally 
presented by Stock and Wise (1990).  This model emphasizes that individuals will retire when 
the utility associated with immediate retirement exceeds the utility associated with retiring at 
some optimal time in the future.  The difference between these payoffs of immediate versus 
deferred retirement is known as the option value of continued work (or deferred retirement).  As 
shown by Stock and Wise in their original and subsequent work, and by Samwick (1998), the 
option value is a comprehensive measure of future retirement incentives that has greater 
explanatory power than measures based on the one-year accrual of retirement wealth or the level 
of retirement wealth.   
Our empirical approach is to estimate the effects of job loss on forward-looking measures 
of retirement wealth accumulation such as option value.  We then examine whether such 
forward-looking incentive measures fully capture the effects of a previous job loss on retirement   6  
by estimating models that include both the option value measure and a dummy variable 
indicating a previous job loss.  
We begin by presenting a model of the retirement decision.  The original Stock and Wise 
formulation does not allow for saving and borrowing: utility in each period is based solely on 
current period income, either from earnings or from pension benefits.  Thus, any temporary 
shock to earnings, which does not induce retirement during the period of the shock, has no effect 
on the retirement decision thereafter.  There is no persistent effect of temporary shocks to 
earnings since consumption cannot be smoothed across time: our focus on the impact of 
displacement makes this feature unappealing.  There is reason to believe that, following a job 
loss, workers may draw on savings or debt to finance a period of job search or depressed 
earnings and we want to allow a role for this in the retirement decision.   
Thus, we propose the following option-value model, based on the concept of Stock and 
Wise, but which allows saving and borrowing across time periods.  We assume that at time t, 
individuals maximize a lifetime utility function of the form: 
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where c is consumption, l is leisure, S is the termination date, and β is the subjective discount 
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where i is the real interest rate, At is the stock of assets at time t and ys is income in period s, 
which depends on the retirement date R.  The last term is the present value of all future income, 
which depends on the retirement date R.  We call this Yt(R):   7  
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Following many previous applications, we assume that the period utility function u(cs, ls) 
is additively separable in consumption and leisure, so that we can write Vt as: 














t l u c u V β β       [ 5 ]  
We assume leisure lt is either 0 or 1: 
  lt = 0   when t < R , before retirement  
  lt = 1   when t ≥ R ,  after retirement 
and we normalize: 
  u
L(0) = 0   and   u
L(1) = UL 
i.e., the utility of leisure takes on a fixed value, and is independent of income.  We further 
assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function with risk aversion parameter 1/α.  Thus, 
we can rewrite the decision as: 






















     [6] 
We assume the subjective discount rate is equal to the real interest rate (i.e., 1/(1+i) = β).  
With this equality and our assumption of time-separable utility, consumption in each period will 
be equal to the present value of lifetime resources divided by the total number of time periods 














   for all t       [ 7 ]  
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Thus, we have a utility function that depends on the present value of lifetime resources plus a 
measure of utility derived from leisure during retirement.  Saving and borrowing allow transfers 
between each period, and the retirement decision is no longer constrained by consuming current 
period income.
 4  Individuals now chose the retirement age (R) that will maximize their lifetime 
utility. 
 
Empirical implementation of the retirement decision model 
  Our empirical approach is to calculate the option value of continued work, defined as the 
difference in utility between immediate retirement and retirement at the optimal age.  The 
calculated option value measure can then be used as the key independent variable in a reduced 
form model of the retirement decision.  If we ignore displacement for the moment, empirical  
                                                           
4 This setup is similar in spirit to that of Stock and Wise.  Their functional form is power utility with parameter γ and 
the value of leisure expressed as a multiplicative factor k on retirement benefits during retirement. 
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If their income Y and benefits B are replaced with consumption Cw before retirement, and consumption Cr after 
retirement, and log utility is used (a limiting case of their power utility, and α=1 in our setup), we get 
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Breaking out the second term: 
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First order conditions would have that consumption is equal in all periods, i.e., Cw=Cr, and thus we have our 
equation [6] where our UL corresponds to their ln(k).   9  
implementation of the retirement decision suggested by [8] is relatively straightforward.  
Information on asset holdings, At , comes directly from the data.  We assume a value for β 
following the approach used in Samwick (1998).
5   We calibrate UL for each feasible value of α 
by choosing the UL which produces a simulated distribution of retirement dates consistent with 
the retirement behavior in the HRS sample.   
We obtain Yit(R) by calculating the following: 
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where  () it s X y
∧
 is expected income while working based on personal characteristics Xit and 
() it s X R y ,
∧
 is expected income while retired based on the retirement age R and personal 
characteristics.  To forecast future earnings, we use earnings information from current jobs and 
from job histories available in the HRS.  We deflate these earnings using the CPI and estimate a 
fixed-effects regression, including a fourth order polynomial in age.  The age effects are then 
used to predict earnings growth at each age from 50 to 75.  Not surprisingly, wage profiles are 
very flat for workers age 50 and over.    The estimated age-earnings profiles are illustrated in 
Appendix Figure 1.  Once retired, expected income will depend on the retirement date, pension 
benefits and benefit timing rules.  For this forecast, we use information on when pension benefits 
will begin, how pensions continue to accrue from the employer while employed and the amounts 
of pension benefits to be received.   
                                                           
5An alternative is to estimate the full dynamic programming model by maximum likelihood.  Samwick (1998) 
assumes values for the discount rate and utility function parameters, noting identification difficulties in precisely 
estimating both parameters.  This approach was also considered in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) who found 
that such models do capture many of the key features of the dynamic retirement model, although they may be 
inferior in predictive power to the fully structural model.   10  
  One complication in calculating Yit(R) for displaced workers is the need to estimate future 
earnings for individuals who are displaced and currently unemployed.   To begin, we assume that  
unemployed displaced workers can return to work with a probability equal to one and that they 
will receive earnings that are reduced from their pre-displacement level by the amounts 
estimated for reemployed displaced workers.  That is, we take the average earnings losses of 
displaced workers estimated in Section 3 and reduce the future earnings of displaced workers by 
that amount.  We note that the predicted earnings for unemployed displaced workers are likely to 
overstate their expected future earnings because the earnings losses are estimated only for the 
sample of individuals who do return to work: we should expect those who are not reemployed to 
face worse wage opportunities.  We later relax the assumption that displaced workers can return 
to work with certainty. 
For each worker, we next calculate a predicted present value of lifetime income measure 
Yit(R), for each possible future retirement age R, and the corresponding lifetime utility Vit(R).  
We then choose the R associated with the highest value of Vit(R) and call this Rit
*, with the 
corresponding lifetime utility denoted by Vit
*.  The value of working versus immediate retirement 
is given by the difference in utility between Vit
* and the value of Vit if the worker retires 
immediately, known as the “option value” of retirement Zit: 
  Zit(R) = Vit
*(R
*) – Vit (t)       [ 1 0 ]  
Having estimated each worker’s option value, we next estimate the likelihood of 
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where Xit include individual and time specific characteristics, and Zit is the option value.  This 
makes clear that displacement should affect the retirement decision through its effects on any of   11  
the variables in Zit(R), including future earnings, asset holdings, and future pension benefits.  In 
addition, if displaced workers face significant barriers to reemployment that prevent them from 
following their optimal retirement strategy, a variable indicating a previous displacement should 
remain significant even after option value measures are included in the regressions. 
 
The HRS analysis sample 
The sample that we use includes all workers (as described in the previous section) who 
are currently at risk for retirement or who have just retired, because our primary interest is in 
examining the effects of displacement and retirement incentive measures on the probability of 
retirement.  Sample means of key variables for the sample used in the analysis are shown in 
Appendix Table 1.  The first two columns in the table are based on the final year in which 
individuals in our analysis sample are observed.  This is the year of retirement for those who 
retire (because they then leave the “at risk” pool) or the final year of observation for those who 
have not yet retired.  The second two columns are based on observations for all person years. 
 
   12  
3.  The Effects of Job Loss on Retirement Incentives  
 
Earnings 
Probably the most widely studied effect of displacement on individual workers is that of 
reduced wages and earnings.
6  Job loss may produce significant changes in workers’ forecasts of 
future labor income opportunities, even once they are reemployed.  Simple summary statistics 
confirm the significant negative impact of displacement on earnings among workers 50 and over 
in the HRS.  Of those who are reemployed, half receive wages that are at least 19 percent below 
their pre-displacement wages, and almost a quarter see their wages halved.   In contrast, workers 
who do not suffer a job loss have wage growth of approximately 5 percent between waves.   
We estimate the effects of job loss on earnings using fixed effects regressions to control 
for both observable and unobservable worker characteristics that might be correlated with 
displacement probabilities.  For the earnings regressions only, we use some additional data 
beyond that described in section 1.  Individuals in the HRS were asked in wave 1 about wages on 
all jobs held prior to wave 1 that lasted five years or more.  By making use of these additional 
wage observations from prior job displacements, we are better able to estimate the effect of 
displacements that occur during and after the survey years.  We use all wage observations from 
1980 and later.
7  Earnings from jobs starting or ending prior to 1980 are eliminated because of 
concerns about the accuracy of retrospective information from more than a decade earlier.  The 
                                                           
6 For example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) find that a typical worker (aged 55 and younger in their 
sample) faces quarterly earnings reductions of up to 25 percent, as much as six years after a job loss.  Ruhm (1991), 
Stevens (1997), and Schoeni and Dardia (1997) also find persistent earnings reductions following job loss.  
Furthermore, Stevens (1997) shows that displaced workers often face substantial employment instability, with 
repeated job losses over the next several years.  Focusing on older workers, Ruhm (1990) finds significant earnings 
reductions among those who leave career jobs for whatever reason, and Couch (1998) finds earnings reductions of 
39 percent in the initial two years after a job loss among first wave respondents of the HRS. 
7 We obtain similar results using a balanced sample in which each individual contributes four wage observations to 
the sample – one in each survey wave and one from a long-term job held prior to wave 1.   13  
dependent variable used is the log of annual salary based on full-year full-time work: individuals 
are asked how much they earn on a given job, and these reports are converted to earnings on an 
annual basis.  This means we are ignoring the portion of earnings losses due to part-year 
unemployment or part-year work.  As noted above, a variable for displacement is coded when a 
job ends as the result of a layoff or business closing.  
The effects of job loss on earnings are summarized in Table 1.  As expected, there are 
large and persistent effects of job loss on earnings.  Among men, earnings are immediately 
reduced by 33 percent, and remain 19 percent below the level expected in the absence of 
displacement after six or more years.  Women experience similar losses, with earnings initially 
reduced by 21 percent, and slightly larger losses six or more years later.  These earnings losses 
point to the first component of the effects of job loss on workers’ gains to deferring retirement.  
There is less gain to continued work because of the often sharp reductions in wages associated 
with post-displacement jobs.  For comparison with our results on asset and pension measures, the 
first row of Table 2 shows the results of a simpler specification of the effects of displacement on 
earnings.  This simplified specification includes only one indicator variable for previous job loss 
instead of the six indicators for years-after-job-loss in Table 1.  The average reduction in 
earnings over all years following job loss is 27 percent for men and 19 percent for women. 
 
Assets 
The effects of job loss on savings or asset holdings is an issue of particular concern for 
those close to typical retirement ages and has been less well documented than the effects of 
displacement on wages.  The loss of income associated with displacement may alter planned 
accumulation of savings for retirement.  It is not immediately clear how changes in these asset   14  
levels will affect the retirement decision in our model since it enters equation [8] in a very non-
linear fashion.  The second row of table 2 shows the effects of displacement on stocks of 
financial assets, excluding home equity.
8  These estimates are based on fixed effects regressions 
that include controls for the calendar year, age, health and marital status.  The results are perhaps 
surprising: for both men and women, there is no statistically significant effect of job loss on non-
pension asset holdings.   
 
Pensions 
We next examine the private pension-related components of the option value to continued 
work.  One expectation is that, among this population of older workers, it will be relatively rare 
for individuals to completely lose their pensions when they experience a job loss since most of 
them will be fully vested in their pension plans.  Some simple tabulations of survey responses in 
the HRS show that indeed, relatively few workers lose their pensions with job loss.
9  Among 
recently displaced workers, only 5.5 percent of those with defined benefit pensions on their 
previous job, and 2.5 percent of those with defined contribution pensions report having lost the 
pension.  The vast majority of those with defined benefit plans on the pre-displacement job (76 
percent) report that they are either currently receiving benefits from the previous job pension, or 
will in the future.  Another 19 percent of this group report that they received a cash settlement 
for their pension at the time of the job loss.  Among displaced workers who had a defined 
contribution pension, 59 percent report that they either rolled over the DC pension into an IRA, 
or left the money in the account to continue accumulating.  A quarter of those with DC pensions 
say that they received a cash settlement for their pension when they left their jobs.   
                                                           
8 Including home equity does not change our results. 
9 See Chan and Stevens (2001b) for more detail on how pension eligibility and amounts are affected by job loss.   15  
  In the third row of Table 2, we examine the effect of displacement on the level of pension 
wealth assuming a retirement age of 65.  As shown in the table, there is no statistically 
significant effect of job loss on the level of pension wealth summarized in this way.  Similar 
results are obtained using the present value evaluated at alternative retirement ages.  This 
confirms that there is not a strong relationship between a recent job loss and the pension wealth 
available to workers.   
  Job loss can still have an important impact on the retirement decision via private 
pensions, even when job loss has no effect on the level of retirement wealth.  The relevant 
question is whether displacement alters the accumulation pattern of pensions.  The fourth row of 
Table 2 looks at the effect of job loss on the “pension gain” from delaying retirement: the 
difference in the present value of pension wealth if retirement occurs immediately versus if it is 
deferred until pension wealth is maximized.
10  The concept is similar to option value, but focuses 
only on the pension component, ignoring income, assets, and the value of leisure in retirement.   
Using this measure of the incentive to delay retirement, we see large effects of displacement on 
the pension-related retirement incentive for men.  The gain in pension wealth from deferring 
retirement among men is significantly reduced by more than $10,000 following job loss.  For 
women, the estimated reduction is $3,131, but this is not statistically significant.  These effects 
of job loss on earnings and pension gain suggest that job loss should have significant effects on 
the decision to retire.
11   
                                                           
10 This measure has been referred to as “peak value” by Coile and Gruber (2000).  
11 We have also considered whether there is an effect of displacement on Social Security benefits.  This could 
happen if displacement affects the average of a worker’s highest 35 quarters of earnings.  In practice, we find no 
evidence of a reduction in estimated Social Security benefits from displacement.    16  
Option Value 
  Finally, we estimate the effect of displacement on workers’ option value, calculated as 
described in the previous section.  For both men and women, there are statistically significant 
negative effects of job loss on option value.  However, these negative impacts are small relative 
to the distribution of option values, as shown in the first and third columns of Table 3.   
  Given that many workers who are displaced begin to receive their pensions immediately, 
or receive some form of cash settlement, job loss may eliminate the gains to delaying retirement, 
resulting in an option value of zero.  If a worker has a pension source not associated with her 
current (post-displacement) job, she will not have sharp gains that accrue from remaining 
employed, and so is less likely to have a positive option value.  Reduced earnings will also make 
it more likely that the net utility gain to continuing employment is non-positive, leading to a zero 
option value.  This effect is illustrated in the last row of Table 2, where we estimate the effect of 
a job loss on the probability of having a zero option value.  A job loss increases the probability of 
zero option value by approximately five percentage points among both men and women.  
  Taken together, the results in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate mechanisms through which job 
loss affects individuals’ retirement decisions.  Because job loss alters workers’ earnings and 
pension provisions, it also alters the option value to delaying retirement and thus should affect 
the timing of retirement.     17  
4.   The Effects of Job Loss on the Retirement Decision 
 
  We next examine the direct relationship between job loss and retirement, and between 
option value and retirement.  The first column of Table 4 shows the effect of having a previous 
job loss on the probability of making a transition to retirement.  The sample used here is all 
individual-year observations in which the person has not already retired or has just retired in the 
past year.  Our dependent variable reflects whether or not the individual retired in the previous 
year.  Specifically, individuals are retired if they answered yes to a question asking if they are 
“completely retired.”  In addition to a variable indicating a previous job loss we include controls 
for health, marital status, availability of retiree health insurance, education, race, and a series of 
dummy variables for age and for calendar year.  As expected, having a recent job loss 
significantly increases the probability of retirement in the current year. For men, the coefficient 
on the variable for a previous job loss is 0.339, indicating an increase in the probability of 
retirement of approximately 3 percentage points.
12  The annual probability of retirement for not 
displaced workers is 9 percent, so displacement increases the probability of retirement each year 
by approximately one-third.  For women, the coefficient for a previous displacement of  0.360 
also suggests an increase in the probability of retirement of around 3 percentage points, or by 
roughly one-third.   A recent job loss substantially increases the probability of retiring from the 
labor force.   
  The calculated option values are next used to explain the probability of retirement.  The 
relationship between retirement and option value is summarized in Table 3, which shows the rate 
of retirement at various points in the distribution of option value.  As expected, the retirement 
                                                           
12 This effect is evaluated for a white 60-year-old married man of average health, with retiree health insurance and 
some college education in 1995.     18  
rate is highest at zero option value and points low in the distribution of positive values.   For 
individuals with option values above the median, retirement rates are substantially lower.  At the 
median of positive option values, the rates of retirement for men and women are 9.8 and 5.2 
percent.  At the 90
th percentile, the comparable rates are just 2.4 and 1.9 percent.   
  The second column of Table 4 shows the results of estimating a logit model for 
retirement, including option value measures and the same set of controls noted above.  We 
include option value, and a dummy variable indicating that option value is equal to zero to allow 
for possible non-linearities in the effect of the option value measure around zero.  The coefficient 
on option value for men and women is –0.25 and is statistically significant.  To interpret this 
coefficient, consider the effect of increasing option value from the median (among those with a 
positive value), to the 75
th percentile of this distribution.  For men, this would increase option 
value by around 1,200, leading to an increase in the probability of retirement of 3 percentage 
points.   For women, a movement from the median to the 75
th percentile would correspond to an 
increase of in option value of approximately 1,000, leading to an increase in the retirement 
probability of 2.5 percentage points.   
  The coefficient for having a zero option value is positive for men, as expected, but not 
statistically significant.  For women, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.  This 
is surprising since it suggests that women with no positive gain to continued work are less likely 
to retire.   One possible explanation could involve liquidity constraints, so that women with very 
little retirement wealth (no private pension, for example) may find it necessary to continue 
working. 
  Consideration of these results, along with the fixed-effects regression of displacement on 
option value from Table 2, suggests that job loss must have strong effects on retirement, above   19  
and beyond those operating through option value.  Having a previous displacement increases 
retirement by approximately 3 percentage points, according to the results in the fifth row of 
Table 2.  From Table 4, we see that a change in option value in excess of 1,000 would be needed 
to generate the same magnitude change in the retirement probability.  Displacement does 
significantly reduce option value, but by a much smaller magnitude.    
The third column of Table 4 confirms this by including both option value and a variable 
for a past displacement in the logit for retirement.  If the reduced-form effect of displacement is 
primarily the result of displacement-induced changes in option value, then the effect of 
displacement should be eliminated by conditioning on workers’ estimated option value.   
Including the option value variables, along with the displacement dummy variable, reduces the 
estimated effect of displacement by only 0.05 for both men and women.  The coefficient on job 
loss when option value controls are included is not significantly different from the coefficient 
when controls are not included.  When option value regressors are included, there continues to be 
an effect of displacement on retirement of roughly 2.5 percentage points.  This suggests that 
much of the increased retirement following job loss may not be financially optimal in the narrow 
sense of solely responding to changes in the option value of retirement, as we have measured it.   
One possible reason why displacement continues to increase retirement even after 
controlling for option value is that we have not accurately captured displaced workers’ true 
earnings possibilities.  Recall that we assign displaced and unemployed workers the earnings that 
might be expected after displacement, based on the average losses experienced by displaced and 
reemployed workers.  However, even reduced earnings may not be available if a displaced 
worker is unable to secure new employment.     20  
To explore this possibility, we calculate an alternative version of the option value 
variable for displaced workers where the probability of returning to work is less than one.  In this 
alternative specification, expected earnings for displaced workers are equal to the probability of 
returning to work multiplied by their (reduced) earnings.  This is a way of incorporating the idea 
that displaced workers may not expect to have much in the way of future earnings, and so may 
choose to retire.  For an estimate of the probability of receiving any future earnings, we turn to 
probabilities generated by previous work on employment transitions following displacement (see 
Chan and Stevens, 2001a).  Our assumption is that workers will base their expectations of future 
income on a probability of securing new employment given their age and other characteristics.  
For example, the probability of returning to work for a 55-year-old man after one year out of 
work is 0.53.   These probabilities will understate the possibility of returning to work since they 
combine the effects of being unable to return to work with the effects of being unwilling to 
return to work.  This should provide a lower bound on the expected future earnings of displaced 
workers.    
The final column of Table 4 shows the results from including this revised option value 
variable (labeled “option value II”), along with the displacement dummy in the retirement logit.  
For men, the effect of displacement is reduced by slightly more, although it still does not differ 
significantly from the full effect of displacement in column one.  For women, there is no change 
in the displacement coefficient from this change in option value.
13    
                                                           
13 This exercise is only suggestive of the effects that employment barriers may have and some caution is required in 
interpreting the coefficients on this option value II measure.  The large coefficients on the variable indicating a zero 
option value, for example, are largely the result of our construction of this alternative option value variable.  For 
displaced individuals who have not returned to work, we assign only a probability of having future earnings. This 
creates a mechanical relationship between not being at work (including those displaced workers who have retired) 
and the earnings component of option value.     21  
We have also performed a similar analysis to that in Table 4 using two alternatives to the 
self-reported retirement measure.  Specifically, we have used an indicator for working, and an 
indicator for working or searching for work, as dependent variables.  With each of these 
dependent variables we estimate regressions including only the displacement dummy (along with 
the control variables) and including the displacement dummy and option value.  In all cases the 
results are similar: a previous displacement significantly lowers the probability of remaining in 
the labor force (or employed) even when conditioning on option value.   
It is perhaps unsurprising that some of the effect of displacement remains after 
controlling for workers’ option value.  It is notable, however, that the vast majority of the 
displacement effect remains after controlling for these retirement incentive measures.  This 
suggests that only a small fraction of displacement-induced changes in retirement and labor force 
participation are the result of workers responding optimally to altered pension and earnings 
incentives, as we have measured them through the option value. 
Retirement is a one-time event.  Thus, unlike the results for the effects of job loss on 
components of financial retirement incentives, the results for retirement behavior cannot be 
estimated with controls for fixed effects.  This raises the concern that the results in Table 4 may 
be biased due to failure to control for unobserved permanent factors that are correlated with both 
the probability of retirement and our independent variables of interest.  In particular, previous 
studies of the effects of displacement (along with our estimates in Table 2) typically include 
fixed effects out of concern that displaced workers may have unobserved characteristics that are 
correlated with wages, employment propensities, etc..   Additionally, in previous work (Chan and 
Stevens, 2001c) we argue that retirement equations identified from cross-sectional variation in 
option value may be biased due to unobserved factors that are correlated with both option value   22  
measures and tastes for retirement.  We next consider whether such unobserved heterogeneity 
might be driving our results in Table 4.  
We use information on individuals’ stated expectations about retirement to provide some 
evidence on the effects of unobserved tastes for retirement.  Employed individuals in the HRS 
are asked “what is the probability that you will continue to work full time after age 62?”  In 
Table 5, we use the responses to this question from the first wave of the survey to control for 
potential heterogeneity in tastes for retirement.  For this table, we limit the sample to 
observations from wave 2 and later, and eliminate workers who were displaced prior to wave 1.  
This gives a measure of retirement expectations elicited prior to job loss.   
The first column of Table 5 shows the results of a logit including variables for a previous 
job loss (occurring some time after wave 1) and for a worker’s stated retirement expectation at 
wave 1.  There continues to be a positive and significant effect of job loss on retirement and the 
expectations variable takes the expected negative sign.  Individuals with a low expectation of 
continuing work beyond age 62 as of wave 1 are more likely to have retired in subsequent waves.   
The effect of displacement for both men and women is roughly 60 percent larger than that shown 
in Table 4.  This is partially a function of the different sample, which includes older workers and 
workers whose job losses occurred more recently than the sample used in Table 4.  The effects of 
job loss among this sample are always larger (though not significantly so) when the expectations 
variables are included.    
The next two columns of Table 5 show the effects of adding option value variables to the 
logit model.  The pattern of these results is very similar to the pattern shown for the fuller sample 
in Table 4.  When the option value variables are added to the specification, the coefficient on 
previous displacement falls by 0.07 among men and 0.04 for women (in Table 4 this was 0.05 for   23  
both men and women).  Once again, the majority of the effect of job loss remains after 
controlling for changes in financial retirement incentives.   This provides some evidence that 
omitted differences in tastes for retirement are not driving our results. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  We find important effects of job loss on the main financial components of workers’ 
incentive to retire.  Labor earnings fall sharply as does the gain in pension wealth from continued 
work.  Fixed-effects regressions show earnings reductions after displacement of 27 and 19 
percent for men and women.  While the level of pension wealth is not significantly altered, the 
gain in pension wealth from deferring retirement is reduced by more than $10,000 for men and 
more than $3,000 for women.  These effects significantly reduce the total option value from 
delaying retirement following job loss.   
These worsened financial conditions should lead to increased rates of retirement among 
displaced workers; however, observed rates of retirement following job loss go beyond the 
effects of purely financial considerations.  Displaced workers retire at substantially higher rates 
than non-displaced workers, even after controlling for the option value of delayed retirement.  
Employment difficulties, high search costs, or other barriers to reemployment may be important 
explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.   
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Dependent variable: Log(Earnings)
1 year after job loss -0.403 -0.232
(0.059) (0.063)
-33.2% -20.7%
2 years after job loss -0.262 -0.150
(0.061) (0.071)
-23.0% -14.0%
3 years after job loss -0.288 -0.235
(0.073) (0.073)
-25.0% -21.0%
4 years after job loss -0.166 -0.156
(0.122) (0.053)
-15.3% -14.5%
5 years after job loss -0.310 -0.107
(0.093) (0.127)
-26.6% -10.2%
6 or more years after job loss -0.211 -0.259
(0.071) (0.086)
-19.0% -22.9%
Number of observations 5,325 4,863
Notes: Fixed effects OLS coefficients.  Standard errors, adjusted for person-level
     clustering, are in parentheses.
Percentage effect on wages in italics.
Table 1: The Effect of Job Loss on EarningsTable 2: The Effect of Job Loss on Components of the Incentive to Retire




number of observations 5,325 4,863
Financial assets 43,658 21,806
(52,578) (36,337)
number of observations 10,785 10,814
Present value of retirement wealth 7,095 -3,409
(14,100) (3,722)
number of observations 10,208 10,684
Pension gain from delaying retirement -10,380 -3,131
(3,091) (2,801)
number of observations 18,836 18,969
Option value (utility) of delaying retirement -136.5 -131.1
(52.1) (45.9)
number of observations 18,836 18,969
Probability of zero option value 0.0478 0.0488
(0.015) (0.019)
number of observations 18,836 18,969
     
Notes: Fixed effects OLS coefficients.  Standard errors, adjusted for person-level clustering,
     are in parentheses.
Each row contains results from a separate regression and shows the effect of job loss on the 
     indicated dependent variable.
Sample for first 3 rows includes one observation per person-survey wave. Sample for 
      subsequent  rows includes one observation per person-year since option value and pension 
      components vary by age.Table 3: Retirement Rates by Percentile of Option Value Distribution
Option Annual Rate Option Annual Rate
Value of Retirement Value of Retirement
Zero option value 0 0.135 0 0.063
 
Distribution of non-zero
    option value:
10th percentile 340 0.134 302 0.075
25th percentile 827 0.120 761 0.060
50th percentile 1,761 0.098 1,544 0.052
75th percentile 3,069 0.056 2,572 0.043
90th percentile 4,472 0.024 3,664 0.019
 
 
Notes: Retirement rates are for individuals with option value up to the given percentile of the 
          distribution of non-zero option values.
Women MenTable 4: The Effects of Job Loss and Option Value on Probability of Retirement
Dependent variable: Retired
Previous job loss 0.339 0.288 0.237 0.360 0.314 0.313
(0.100) (0.180) (0.099) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Option Value ('000) -0.250 -0.240 -0.250 -0.250  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.038) (0.038)
Zero Option Value 0.061 0.059 -0.222 -0.226
(0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103)
Option Value II ('000) -0.230 -0.250
(0.053) (0.038)
   
Zero Option Value II 0.154 -0.196
(0.102) (0.101)
Number of observations
Notes: Logit coefficients.  Standard errors, adjusted for person-level clustering, are in parentheses.
Models also include controls for education, health, marital status, race, age, retiree health insurance 
       availability and calendar year.
Option Value II refers to option value calculated assuming that displaced and not employed workers 
       have expected earnings that incoporate probabilities of returning to work of less than one.
18,541 18,866
Men WomenTable 5: The Effect of Job Loss and Option Value on the Probability of Retirement,
               Controlling for Retirement Expectations
  Men Women
Dependent variable: Retired
Previous job loss 0.552 0.484 0.510 0.468
(0.158) (0.159) (0.180) (0.179)
Option Value -0.250 -0.242 -0.260 -0.250
(0.087) (0.087) (0.052) (0.052)
Zero Option Value -0.268 -0.260 -0.529 -0.543
(0.173) (0.173) (0.164) (0.164)
Wave 1 subjective probability -1.464 -1.457 -1.460 -1.214 -1.201 -1.213
    of working at age 62 (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.152) (0.153) (0.154)
   
Number of observations
Notes: Logit coefficients.  Standard errors, adjusted for person-level clustering, are in parentheses.
Models also include controls for education, health, marital status, race, age, retiree health insurance 
       availability and calendar year.
Sample includes observations from waves 2 and 3.  Displacements are after wave 1 only.
9,344 9,015Appendix Table 1: Sample Means
 
Men Women Men Women
Retired 0.33 0.22 0.07 0.05
Option Value 1,218 1,137 1,782 1,448
Peak Value $22,485 $10,045 $44,946 $16,565
Annual Earnings $35,610 $19,259 $37,822 $19,766
Financial Assets $228,005 $177,058 $202,678 $148,564
Previous Displacement 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09
Has Retiree Health Insurance 0.30 0.23 0.28 0.22
High School Graduate 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.39
Some College 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.20
 
College Graduate 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.16
Age 60.1 59.4 57.9 57.3
Self-reported health   2.61 2.62 2.50 2.55
      (1=poor, 5=excellent)
Married 0.86 0.68 0.87 0.68
Number of observations 3,997 3,962 18,541 18,866
Individuals in their All person-years
final year of observation 








50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Age
Average Annual Earnings
High school or less More than high school